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Summary Findings
We present a new database of social security indicators for eleven 
Latin American countries designed to assess pension schemes in terms 
of the payments they promise in return to contributions. Based on 
this data, we analyze inequality, insurance and incentives to work, 
using the replacement rates and the internal rates of return implicit 
in the flows of contributions and pensions. Our results indicate that 
most programs analyzed are progressive in the sense that, other things 
equal, they yield higher returns to low than to high income workers. 
Poor workers, notwithstanding, often have flat age-earnings profiles 
and lower life expectancy, both of which reduce the rates of return 
received  from  social  security. The  Argentinean  and  (the  pre-2008) 
Uruguayan  programs  severely  punish  short  contribution  careers, 
providing strong incentives for workers in the programs to continue 
contributing until they reach minimums that vary between 30 and 35 
years of contributions. The counterpart is that these programs do not 
hedge workers against the risk of having short working careers; quite the 
opposite, they raise the uncertainty workers face. The very low rates of 
return that the Argentinean and Uruguayan main pension programs pay 
to workers with short working careers are likely to impact strongly on 
low income workers, as the probability they experience interruptions 
is higher. The Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican programs show a better 
balance between insurance against the risk of short working careers 
and incentives to work. The defined benefit programs of Argentina, 
Ecuador and Uruguay strongly discourage early retirement; the Chilean 
and Mexican programs are more neutral. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
passed  reforms  to  their  main  pension  programs  in  2008.  Unlike 
the Argentinean  reform,  the  Chilean  and  Uruguayan  2008  reforms 
strengthened  the  social  protection  that  programs  provide,  shifting 
the  balance  towards  more  insurance  and  less  incentives  to  work.
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Abstract: We present a new database of social security indicators for eleven Latin American countries 
designed to assess pension schemes in terms of the payments they promise in return to contributions. 
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that most programs analyzed are progressive in the sense that, other things equal, they yield higher 
returns to low than to high  income workers. Poor workers, notwithstanding,  often have flat age-
earnings profiles and lower life expectancy, both of which reduce the rates of return received from 
social security. The Argentinean and (the pre-2008) Uruguayan programs severely punish short 
contribution careers, providing strong incentives for workers in the programs to continue contributing 
until they reach minimums that vary between 30 and 35 years of contributions. The counterpart is that 
these programs do not hedge workers against the risk of having short working careers; quite the 
opposite, they raise the uncertainty workers face. The very low rates of return that the Argentinean and 
Uruguayan main pension programs pay to workers with short working careers are likely to impact 
strongly on low income workers, as the probability they experience interruptions is higher. The Brazilian, 
Chilean and Mexican programs show a better balance between insurance against the risk of short 
working careers and incentives to work. The defined benefit programs of Argentina, Ecuador and 
Uruguay strongly discourage early retirement; the Chilean and Mexican programs are more neutral. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay passed reforms to their main pension programs in 2008. Unlike the 
Argentinean reform, the Chilean and Uruguayan 2008 reforms strengthened the social protection that 
programs provide, shifting the balance towards more insurance and less incentives to work. 
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In this paper, we present a new database of social security indicators designed to assess 
pension schemes in terms of the payments they promise in return to contributions. We use this data 
to assess several Latin American pension programs in terms of their impact on income inequality, 
insurance and incentives to work. The indicators are based on micro-simulations of lifetime 
contributions and pension rights according to existing norms. We provide two synthetic indicators: 
the internal rate of return (IRR) and the replacement rate (RR) implicit in the simulated cash flows of 
contributions and benefits. The current version of the database covers the main pension programs 
in eleven Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The design of a pension scheme has important implications in terms of income inequality, insurance 
and incentives to work. These effects are difficult to assess because the outcome depends on the 
interactions between several parameters of the scheme as well as on characteristics of the 
population and the economy. The IRR and the RR are two synthetic indicators useful in this 
assessment. The IRR measures the benefit workers receive in return for their contributions, in terms 
of an implicit rate of return of their contributions. The RR is the pension-wage ratio and provides a 
direct measure of the ability of the scheme to replace the wages that cease when a worker retires. 
Our analysis focuses on the design of the schemes and hence on the promises they make rather than 
on  actual performance. This acknowledgment/warning is important in a region where  the gap 
between de jure and de facto policies is often wide. Most pension administrations cannot strictly 
abide by the law simply because they do not have the information they need to apply the rules. Also 
many workers who are legally covered by pension schemes are not covered in practice. 
Notwithstanding, the analysis of the design of the schemes and their adequacy to the local 
demographic and economic conditions is an important  ingredient of a broader assessment of 
pension schemes in Latin America. 
This paper and the accompanying database are part of a broader project to generate a new set of 
indicators of social security performance across the world. Using IRRs and RRs to assess pension 
programs is of course not new (see, among many others, Duggan et al. 1995; Leimer 1999; Beach 
and Davis 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 2001; Afonso and Fernandes 2005), but to the best of our 2 
knowledge there is no similar database that provides estimations of these indicators for Latin 
American pension programs on standardized and comparable conditions. The most direct 
antecedents of this contribution are Robalino (2005), who follows a similar strategy to assess 
incentives, redistribution and sustainability of the pension schemes in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and Dorfman and Forteza (2008), who present a similar analysis for the Caribbean. 
In the following section, we present the methodology. In Section 3 we present the estimated IRRs 
and RRs in a base case scenario in each country. In Sections 4 and 5 we analyze income inequality, 
insurance and incentives using these same indicators with different simulations. Section 6 
concludes. The appendix contains a brief description of the pension programs. 3 
I.  Methodology 
Social security programs involve pretty complex contracts between workers, employers and 
social security administrations. Workers and employers are supposed to contribute over several 
decades in exchange for pensions, some of which have to be paid until death, and often even 
beyond death (survivor benefits). Assessing the design of a program is not simple as the impact of 
each norm on the final result depends on other norms plus some demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of the covered population. The internal rates of return (IRRs) and the replacement 
rates(RRs) are synthetic indicators that summarize the interactions between all these ingredients 
and provide the basis for meaningful comparisons across programs and time. 
Replacement rates denote “the value of a pension as a proportion of a worker's wage during some 
base period, such as the last year or two before retirement or the entire lifetime average wage” 
(World Bank, 1994, p xxiii). In order to make the results comparable across countries, we 
standardized this measure choosing the last year as the base period. In the denominator, we 
compute all labor income (net of contributions), and not only insured wages, because we want to 
measure the proportion of worker’s labor income that is replaced with pensions. In a few cases, we 
will also refer to the replacement rates as they are defined in the norms of programs. To avoid 
confusion, we will refer to the latter as the technical replacement rates. Unlike the RRs, the 
technical replacement rates are not directly comparable across countries and programs because of 
different definitions of the reference wage. Notice that the RRs can be computed not only in defined 
benefit programs that have a well-defined technical replacement rate, but also in defined 
contribution and mixed social security programs, and the interpretation is the same:   The 
percentage of the final wage that is replaced with the initial pension. In this document, the RRs will 
be used primarily to better-understand what is driving the estimated IRRs, but also to assess the 
income-smoothing goal of pension schemes. 
The literature has followed two different strategies to perform this type of analysis (Leimer 1999). 
One is to use surveys and social security records to gather data on contributions paid and benefits 
received by workers. The other strategy is to simulate flows of labor income of hypothetical workers 
and compute the contributions and benefits according to existing norms. We follow the second 
approach, partly dictated by data availability and partly by our goals. We want to build a database of 
social security indicators that can be used to assess the design of the systems and that allow for 4 
cross-country comparisons. In developing countries, the  gap between design and actual 
implementation is usually large, hence contributions paid and benefits received may not accurately 
reflect the design of the programs. If our goal were instead to assess the performance of a program 
in a certain period or under specific circumstances that were observed in one or more countries, the 
first approach would probably be more appropriate. Regarding cross-country comparisons, it is 
usually difficult and risky to compare results provided in different studies because the assumptions 
are different. It is obviously easier to standardize conditions to facilitate comparisons using 
simulated working life histories than data from surveys and administrative records. 
We simulate the cash flows of contributions and pensions and compute the IRRs and the RRs first in 
a “base case scenario” and then in other scenarios designed to perform sensitivity analysis. In all our 
simulations workers are born in 2007. Unless explicitly indicated, we assume they will be subject to 
the social security rules as of 2007. 
In the base case scenario, workers’ lifetime average labor income is equal to their respective 
country’s per capita GDP over their working life. In a few cases in which wages computed in this way 
would have been lower than the legal minimum wage, we imposed the legal minimum. Gross 
domestic product per capita was assumed to grow at the same constant rate in all countries and 
scenarios, so that the differences we receive in the IRRs and the RRs are not driven by different rates 
of growth. 
Workers in the base case scenario have the same age-earnings profile across countries. Real wages 
grow at the same rate as real GDP per capita, equal to 2 ppa (percent per annum).
1
                                                 
1 This assumption ensures that in our simulations the aggregate labor income to GDP ratio remains constant, 
which is one of the stylized facts of long run growth as first described by Kaldor (see, for example, Acemoglu 
2009). 
  In this scenario, 
workers start working at 30 and contribute without interruptions until they retire at 65 in all 
countries. Individuals live until they reach the “age of death”, which is 20 plus life expectancy at 20. 
With this choice we are approximating  the  expected life length at the earliest age at which 
simulated workers are assumed to start working and contributing. Our indicators are hence 
conditional on having survived until age 20. Life expectancy was taken from WHO (2008), which 
presents data for the year 2006. The WHO tables represent the whole country’s population rather 
than the population that contribute to the social security systems. It is possible that these statistics 
underestimate the life expectancy of contributors to pension programs because in Latin America the 5 
pool of contributors are relatively better off and are likely to have higher life expectancy than the 
excluded. Because of this, the IRRs that actual contributors are receiving might be higher than 
reported in this study. 
In the current version of our database, simulated workers are single males, who do not generate 
survivor benefits or suffer disability, so the only benefit they effectively receive  is the old-age 
pension. These workers are nevertheless covered by disability and survivor insurance as well, and 
therefore contribute to the old-age, survivor and disability programs. They simply are not eligible for 
survival and disability benefits because we assumed that they do not suffer disability and leave no 
survivors. Workers who do generate survivor benefits or receive a disability pension would receive 
higher IRRs than the set of workers simulated in the current version. 
The flows over which we compute the IRRs include both the insured and the employers’ 
contributions. Some might disagree with this choice, possibly arguing that only the insured 
contributions fall on workers shoulders. Most economists would argue however that this distinction 
is not economically meaningful since both the insured and the employers’ contributions are part of 
the payroll taxes. What could be more relevant is to split the impact of contributions between lower 
after-tax wages and higher labor costs. Payroll taxes would reduce after-tax wages one-to-one in the 
long run in a neoclassical small open economy model. In this environment, contributions represent a 
burden on workers’ shoulders and should be fully included in the simulated cash flows. In practice in 
a non-neoclassical world, the impact of payroll taxes on after-tax wages might be smaller than one-
to-one even over relatively extended periods. If this is so, the burden of the system on workers 
would be smaller than assumed in our simulations. Nevertheless, computing the cash flows with 
total contributions would still be appropriate to assess the cost that the program imposes on the job 
position, which might be the most relevant approach in assessing incentive issues. In a non-
neoclassical world, this assumption would be less appropriate for the assessment of the impact of 
pension programs on income inequality. 
It should be noted that most pension programs have other sources of funds on top of contributions. 
Most governments partially finance these programs from general taxes. We made no attempt at 
computing the general taxes workers pay to indirectly finance pensions. The rates of return that 
workers receive from the pension programs are thus likely to be lower than what our simulations 
suggest. This is particularly true in the case of countries with mature pension programs, which 
usually have deficits that  governments help to finance. If the payroll and general taxes were 6 
distributed similarly among workers, the results we got in terms of income redistribution would 
probably not differ qualitatively from what we would have gotten had we been able to compute all 
sources of pension funds. Under these conditions, the same workers who are net winners (losers) 
according to our analysis would continue being so in a more complete analysis that included these 
other sources of pension funds. In turn, the incentives to work should not hinge too much on 
general taxes that workers must pay independently of whether they participate in the social security 
system. Consider for example the case of Uruguay, where part of the value added tax is earmarked 
to finance pensions. One could argue that the decision to participate in formal labor markets is 
relatively independent of the decision to pay the value added tax. Things might be less clear in the 
case of the income tax, for the decision to evade social security contributions could somehow be 
linked to the decision to evade the income tax. 
In the spirit of Whitehouse (2007), we standardized some conditions to make the results more 
comparable across countries and to focus mainly on design issues. We assumed that all pension 
funds and annuity providers receive the same 3.5 ppa real interest rate (net of fees and other costs) 
across countries and programs. While it is possible that different programs get different real interest 
rates, we prefer at this stage to explore differences between programs that do not hinge on the 
divergent abilities of the pension funds to yield different net returns. We used the same interest 
rate for discounting. 
The insurable wage ceilings, the minimum and maximum pensions, minimum wages, insured wage 
thresholds and all other system parameters that are set in nominal terms grow at the same rate as 
the average wage and the nominal GDP per capita. In all the simulations and countries these 
variables grow at 4.5 ppa. These assumptions ensure that these variables maintain a constant 
proportion over time, which looks like a sensible assumption in the long run. 
The results are particularly sensitive to the assumptions made about the adjustment of pensions 
and, to a lesser extent, the “valorization” of wages for pension computation. In most countries, we 
did not find formal indexation rules. Failing to adjust pensions to prices has been a common practice 
in the region. Nevertheless, we assumed that all programs index pensions to the consumer price 
index, unless explicitly indicated otherwise. Analogously, we adjusted wages used to compute 
pensions in defined benefit  programs (“valorization”) according to inflation. Uruguay is an 
exception, since the constitution explicitly mandates indexation of pensions and valorization of 7 
wages to the average wage index. So too, in the Argentinean PAYG pillar, wages are “valorized” with 
the average wage index (see the appendix for the details). 
All the flows are before taxes, so we computed gross IRRs. All the IRRs we present are real. The basic 
rules and parameters of each pension scheme were taken from Social Security Administration 
(2008) and complemented with local sources in most countries. We present a summary of the main 
provisions in each program in the appendix. 
We performed sensitivity analysis in five dimensions, namely:  (i) the average wage level, (ii) the 
age-earnings profile, (iii) life expectancy, (iv) the enrollment age, and (v) the age of retirement. The 
average wage  along the lifecycle of the simulated workers was set at five different levels, 
corresponding to one-quarter, one-half, one, two and four times the country’s average GDP per 
capita over their working life.
2
                                                 
2 As already mentioned, wages were set at the legal minimum whenever these rules yielded a wage below the 
minimum. 
  The age-earnings profile is the profile of earnings along the lifecycle. 
We generated three profiles setting the rate of growth of the real wage at 1, 2 and 3 percent per 
year in real terms. The age of death was set at 20 plus life expectancy at 20 in the base scenario and 
reduced in 1 and 2 years in other two scenarios. We assessed the impact of the length of the period 
of contributions on the IRRs simulating different enrolment ages, keeping the retirement ages as in 
the base scenario. In turn, we analyzed the impact of the age of retirement changing this variable 
and keeping constant the enrolment age. It should be noted that this approach implies that the 
length of the period of contributions is being changed in parallel to the age of retirement. 8 
II.  Results in the Base Case Scenario 
We provide in this section a relatively detailed description of the results in each pension 
program in the base case scenario. We hope readers familiar with Latin American pension programs 
will find this description useful to assess our results. Readers unfamiliar with these programs might 
not find this description particularly useful and we suggest they skip this section. In the following 
sections, we focus on stylized facts that are probably more interesting for all readers. 
The middle column in Table 1 presents the real internal rates of return (IRRs) we got in our base case 
scenario. Other columns present IRRs for workers whose average labor incomes differ from that in 
the base scenario. The table shows much diversity across countries, programs and labor income 
levels, with IRRs ranging from -2.5 to 8.1 ppa. 
In the Argentinean PAYG pillar, workers in the base case scenario would receive basically a zero IRR. 
These workers would start their working career at 30 (in 2037) paying a contribution of about   
US$ 2,700 per annum, would continue paying contributions that would gradually increase up to a 
maximum of about US$ 5,300 when they reach 64 (in 2071), and would receive a pension of   
US$ 16,900 at 65 until they die at 73.
3
Opting for the individual account pillar, this same worker would receive about 0.9 ppa. With the 
same contributions as in the PAYG pillar, this worker would receive a pension of about US$ 20,300 
per annum, composed of the same US$ 3,221 basic pension plus an annuity of about US$ 17,100. 
The striking fact about this result is that this IRR is much smaller than the rate of return of the 
pension funds that we assumed to run these simulations (3.5 ppa). The reason is that only insured 
  Their initial pension would represent about 80 percent of 
their final wage. This pension would be composed of two terms, the basic (US$ 3,221) and the 
additional (US$ 13,680) pension. The additional pension is computed as the average wage of the last 
10 years times a technical replacement rate that positively depends on the number of years of 
contribution (with a minimum of 52.5 percent). As expected, the representative worker in our 
simulations would be receiving neither the minimum nor the maximum pension, so the IRR we get 
for this worker is not driven by these provisions. 
                                                 
3 The cash flows are expressed in 2007 US dollars.  Remember that this flow corresponds to a worker whose 
average lifetime labor income equals Argentina’s GDP per capita during his working time (2037-2071). Given 
the assumption that real GDP per capita grows at an annual average rate of 2 percent and that 2007 GDP per 
capita was about US$ 6,600, this worker’s average labor income turns out to be approximately US$17,180. 9 
contributions go to the pension fund while the employer contributions finance the basic pension. 
The rate of return of the insured contributions to the accounts is 3.5 ppa in this simulation by 
assumption, but the rate of return of the employer contributions is negative, so that the total IRR in 
the pillar turns out to be much smaller than the assumed 3.5 ppa. 
Bolivian workers in the base case scenario would receive an IRR of 3.5 ppa. They would start working 
at 30 paying a contribution of about US$ 303 per annum and would continue paying contributions 
that would gradually increase up to a maximum of US$ 595 when they turned 64. They would 
receive a pension of US$ 7,345 at 65 until they died at 69. Since this is not the minimum pension, 
and the individual contribution is not affected by the floor or the ceiling, it is not surprising that the 
IRR is exactly the interest rate assumed to be earned by the pension funds and the insurance 
companies. Workers would not receive any subsidy in this scenario. Their initial pension would 
represent about 172 percent of their final wage. 
Brazilian workers would receive an IRR of about -1.1 ppa in this scenario. They would start paying a 
yearly contribution of about US$ 3,500 at the age of 30, would continue paying contributions that 
would gradually increase up to a maximum of about US$ 6,900 when they reach 64, and would 
receive a pension of about US$ 23,900 at 65 until they die at 71. Therefore, their initial pension 
would represent about 110 percent of their final wage. 
Chilean workers would receive an IRR of about 3.5 ppa in the base case scenario. They would start 
paying about US$ 2,245 in contributions at the age of 30, would continue paying contributions that 
would gradually increase up to a maximum of US$ 4,400 when they reach 64, and would receive a 
pension of about US$ 22,180 at 65 until they die at 76. In this case the initial pension would 
represent around 72 percent of their final wage. As in the Bolivian case, these workers are not being 
benefited with any subsidy, therefore the IRR equals the interest rate pension funds are assumed to 
get. 
In the base case scenario, Colombian workers would receive an IRR of about 3.5 ppa if they opted 
for the individual account pillar. They would start paying contributions of about US$ 1,080 at age 30, 
their maximum contributions would round the US$ 2,120 at 64 and their first pension would be of 
about US$ 14,000, which represents 110 percent of their final wage. They would keep receiving this 
amount of pension until they die at 73. Colombian workers would receive a worse deal in this 
scenario if they opted for the PAYG pillar rather than for the individual account pillar. For the same 10 
amount of contributions in their lifetime, they would receive a pension of about US$ 9,900 at age 
65, which represents 78 percent of their last wage. They would receive an IRR of only 2.2 ppa. 
The Ecuadorian PAYG system promises one of the highest IRRs in the base case scenario in our 
sample of countries: 4.9 ppa. Workers would start contributing at 30 about US$ 580 per annum and 
at 64 the contributions would have increased up to US$ 1,145. At age 65 they would receive their 
first pension of about US$ 10,370 and would continue earning that amount (in real terms) every 
year until they die at 73. Given the amount of their last real wage (US$ 11,760), this implies a 
replacement rate of 94 percent. 
Mexican workers would receive 4.1 ppa (i.e., more than the 3.5 ppa assumed rate of return of the 
pension fund and despite this program being an individual account system)  because of the 
contributions the Mexican government pay to each individual account, the so-called “social 
contribution” (cuota social).They would start their working career paying a contribution of about 
US$ 1,330 per annum at 30, would continue paying contributions that would gradually increase up 
to a maximum of US$ 2,600 when they turned 64, and would receive a pension of US$ 16,290 at 65 
until they died at 75. Their initial pension would represent about 55 percent of their final wage.  
The minimum wage is larger than per capita GDP in Paraguay. Since we cannot assume that workers 
contribute by less than the legal minimum, we built this scenario with workers earning the minimum 
wage. They would start contributing about US$ 1,200 per annum at 30 and would continue paying 
increasing contributions up to a maximum of about US$ 2,400 at 64. They would receive a pension 
of US$ 10,133 at 65 until they died at 75. Their initial pension would represent 108 percent of their 
last wage and they would receive an IRR of 2.4 ppa. 11 
Table 1:  Internal Rates of Return and Average Wages (IRRs in %) 
  Average Wage in Simulations Relative to Per Capita GDP 
   One-Quarter  One-Half  One  Two  Four 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  2.8  1.7  0.9  0.5  0.0 
Argentina (PAYG)  3.1  0.9  0.0  -0.5  -1.1 
Bolivia  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Brazil  -0.6  -1.1  -1.1  -1.3  -1.4 
Chile  b/  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  4.1  4.1  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (PAYG)  3.6  3.6  2.2  1.7  1.7 
Ecuador  4.9  4.9  4.9  4.9  4.5 
Mexico  6.7  4.5  4.1  3.9  3.8 
Paraguay  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.4 
Peru (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Peru (PAYG)  4.6  4.4  2.2  1.1  -2.5 
Uruguay (Opting for mixed DB-DC) a/ b/  2.6  1.6  1.6  0.4  1.0 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime)      a/  b/  1.5  -0.5  -0.5  0.4  1.0 
Venezuela  8.1  7.8  6.7  6.0  6.0 
                 
Note:  a/ Workers earning less than US$5,000 of may 1995 per month (approximately US$ 8,900 
per annum, in 2007 US dollars) participate only in the PAYG-DB pillar –the “ordinary regime”–, 
unless they explicitly opt to deposit half of their personal contributions to the savings account pillar.  
b/ Computed with current norms, which are in the process of being modified by laws passed in 
2008.  
Assumptions: Real wages growing at 2% per year, 35 years contributing, retirement at 65, age of 
death is 20 plus life expectancy at 20, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 
Peruvian workers opting for the individual account regime would receive an IRR of 3.5 ppa, which is 
to be expected given that this is a pure savings regime with no interference of subsidies in the cash 
flow. They would contribute about US$ 900 at 30, would continue paying contributions that would 
gradually increase up to a maximum of US$ 1,770 when they reached 64, and would receive a 
pension of about US$ 10,500 at 65 until they died at 74. 
If they chose the PAYG program the deal would be clearly worse under our assumptions since the 
contributions are slightly higher and the benefits are clearly lower than in the individual account 
program. Peruvian workers would receive an IRR of 2.2 ppa, a difference of 1.3 ppa. They would 
contribute about US$ 920 at 30, would continue paying contributions that would gradually increase 
up to a maximum of US$ 1,800 when they turned 64, and would receive a pension of about   
US$ 8,000 at 65. Workers opting for the individual account program replace 87 percent and for the 
PAYG program replace 66 percent of their last net wage. 12 
Uruguayan workers earning the country’s per capita GDP may get very different results depending 
on whether they opt to contribute only to the PAYG or to both the PAYG and the individual account 
pillars. In the Uruguayan program workers earning less than a certain threshold (currently about US$ 
8,900 per annum) will by default contribute only to the PAYG pillar, unless they explicitly opt to split 
their personal contributions between the two pillars. Workers earning the country’s per capita GDP 
will belong to this category during most of their working career. According to our results, these 
workers will receive a much higher IRR if they opt for the mixed PAYG-individual account scheme 
(1.6 ppa) than if they stay with only the PAYG program (-0.5 ppa). Not surprisingly, most workers 
opted for the mixed scheme. 
Uruguayan workers in the base case scenario would start their working career at 30 paying a 
contribution of about US$ 2,800 per annum, and would continue paying contributions that would 
gradually increase up to a maximum of US$ 5,560 when they turned 64. If they did not choose to 
participate in the two pillars, they would receive an initial pension of about US$ 15,100. This pension 
would grow in real terms, reaching a maximum of US$ 17,400 at 72. Pensions grow in our 
Uruguayan simulation, unlike in other cases, because pensions are by constitution indexed to the 
average wage and we assumed the real wages grow at 2 ppa. The initial pension would represent 
about 72 percent of the final wage. Workers would receive a much better result if they opted to split 
their contributions between the two pillars. With the same total amount of contributions as in the 
other regime (but with a different distribution between pillars), these workers would receive an 
initial pension of US$ 22,800 per annum, distributed almost in halves between the DB pension and 
the annuity. 
Finally, in the base case scenario, Venezuelan workers receive the highest IRR of the entire region 
with 6.7 ppa. They would start contributing about US$ 1,015, and would reach the maximum 
contribution of about US$ 1,990 at age 64. At 65 they would receive a pension of about US$ 25,200 
until they died at age 74. The first pension would represent about 87 percent of the final wage net 
of contributions. This replacement rate is not unusually large, but the IRRs are nevertheless 
comparatively high because of the low contribution rates this program charges (less than 7 percent). 
All the simulations were run with the same 3.5 interest rate earned by the pension funds and the 
insurance companies and yet only the Bolivian, the Chilean, and the individual account pillars of the 
Colombian and Peruvian social security systems would yield that rate of return. It is natural that the 
DB schemes in PAYG pillars and the Uruguayan mixed program do not yield the assumed interest 13 
rate, but it is less obvious why the individual account pillar in Argentina and Mexico yield something 
different.  The reason lies with the non-DC ingredients present in these schemes. In the case of 
Argentina, there is the already mentioned basic pension, financed with the employers’ 
contributions. Because of this, the Argentinean workers earn in the individual account pillar much 
less than the assumed 3.5 ppa. The Mexican representative worker benefits from a government 
contribution to the individual account (cuota social). This is a flat amount equal to 5.5 percent of the 
minimum wage. 14 
III.  Impact of Pension Programs on Income Inequality 
Pension schemes generate redistribution, not only in terms of redistributing towards those 
workers who were negatively affected by shocks, which is the typical insurance function of social 
security, but also in expected terms. The implicit internal rates of return (IRRs) indicate the type of 
redistribution that takes place through the pension system:   beneficiaries of the redistributive 
process will have higher expected IRRs. 
The pension schemes are supposed to be progressive in the sense that workers with low average 
income should receive higher returns than the well off. But workers with steeper age-earnings 
profiles often receive higher rates of return as well, and these workers tend to have high income. 
Also workers with high life expectancy tend to benefit from the system, as they will likely receive 
pensions for longer periods of time than workers with low life expectancy, and poorer workers 
usually have lower life expectancy.  There are winners and losers between generations as well. We 
summarize in this section the results of simulations that we ran to specifically analyze the impact of 
pension schemes on income inequality. 
3.1.  Impact of the Average Wage 
The public pension schemes analyzed in this study provide in principle higher IRRs to low 
than to high income workers. We compared the implicit IRRs paid by the pension schemes to 
workers whose lifetime average income lies between one-quarter of and four times the country’s 
per capita GDP (Table 1).
4
In most simulations in this series, high income workers received  lower IRRs than low income 
workers. The equalizing redistribution is generally performed in the DB-PAYG programs through 
minimum and maximum pensions. For example, the Argentinean PAYG pillar has a maximum 
pension that is about seven times the minimum. The Argentinean system also performs 
redistributions through the basic pension. This benefit, which covers workers who opted for either 
regime, does not depend on contributed amounts and therefore is pretty flat across income levels. 
 
                                                 
4 The range of simulated wages is in some cases actually narrower than one to sixteen, because when the 
country’s minimum wage is larger than one or more of these thresholds, we imposed the minimum. 15 
This is why the computed IRRs in the Argentinean individual account pillar decrease with income 
levels. 
The Ecuadorian and Paraguayan programs do not look very progressive according to our 
simulations, despite being DB-PAYG programs. In the case of Paraguay, the range of average lifetime 
labor incomes used turned out to be narrower than initially planned because we could not simulate 
workers earning GDP per capita or less since the minimum wage is larger than GDP per capita. 
Hence, rather than simulating wages ranging from one-fourth to four times per capita GDP we 
simulated Paraguayan wages ranging from about 1.5 to 4 times per capita GDP.
5
The Colombian PAYG program looks moderately progressive, according to our simulations. Whereas 
workers earning four times per capita GDP receive an IRR of only 1.7 ppa, those in the quarter-of-
per-capita-GDP scenario receive 3.6 ppa. The latter actually earn the minimum wage and receive the 
minimum pension. Their comparatively high IRR is partly driven by the minimum pension. 
  A similar issue 
arises in the case of Ecuador. The minimum wage is in this case higher than one-half per capita GDP 
so that the first two scenarios (a quarter and a half of per capita GDP) are actually the same. The 
simulated  wages in Ecuador range from 0.6 to 4 times per capita GDP. In these wage ranges, 
contributions and pensions scale up proportionally in Paraguay and almost proportionally in Ecuador 
as wages increase.  Hence, the IRRs are the same or almost the same in these scenarios. It remains 
to be seen whether, for other wage ranges and histories of contribution, the social security 
programs in Ecuador and Paraguay are more redistributive than what our simulations show. 
The Peruvian PAYG is the most progressive program in the region, if we measure progressiveness by 
the difference between the IRRs received by the richest and the poorest worker in our simulations. 
This result is mostly driven by the relatively small difference that exists in this program between 
minimum and maximum pensions (the maximum is about twice the minimum). Because of this, 
workers earning two and four times the country’s per capita GDP are both capped by the maximum 
pension, with the former paying half as much as the latter in contributions. At the other end of our 
simulated wage range, all workers earning half of per capita GDP or less receive the same minimum 
pension in this scenario even though workers earning half of per capita GDP contribute more than 
their poorer counterparts. 
                                                 
5 We could have simulated richer workers to get the same wage spread in Paraguay as in other countries, but 
we preferred to build the base case scenario in all countries with workers earning per capita GDP (or the 
closest possible to that amount when minimum wages were above per capita GDP). 16 
The Uruguayan pension program has a minimum and a maximum pension in its DB-PAYG pillar. 
Nevertheless, as the results in Table 1 show, this program may well yield lower IRRs to workers who 
earn less (see, for example, the cases of workers earning one and two times the country’s per capita 
GDP). This is because of a composition effect:  The annuity (which yields a higher return than the DB 
pension in these simulations) represents a greater share of the total pension for high than for low 
income workers. In fact, workers whose annual income does not surpass US$ 8,900 will only receive 
the DB pension (i.e., a negative IRR) unless they explicitly opt to contribute to both pillars. 
The Venezuelan system delivers higher IRRs to low than to high income workers for the whole wage 
range we considered in the simulations. The program has a highly redistributive ingredient in the 
basic pension, which is a flat benefit independent of the insured’s wages. 
The Bolivian, Chilean and Peruvian individual account schemes yield the same IRRs for a wide range 
of income levels. In fact, in all the simulations presented in Table 1 for these regimes, the IRR is the 
same for all workers. All these programs, save the Peruvian individual account pillar, have some 
redistributive ingredients, but they do not show up in any of the simulations presented in the table. 
The Bolivian program has minimum pensions. In the Chilean case,  the government provides a 
supplement to workers who contributed at least 20 years but whose accumulated funds do not self-
finance a pension above the “minimum pension guarantee”. This provision obviously departs from 
actuarial fairness since workers with sufficiently low contributions receive IRRs above the assumed 
(net) rate of return of pension funds and insurance companies. Be that as it may, none of the 
workers simulated in Table 1 profit from this minimum. 
A reform passed in the Chilean parliament in January 2008 will gradually substitute the “solidarity 
contribution” (Aporte Previsional Solidario) for the “minimum pension guarantee” (Pensión Mínima 
Garantizada). The solidarity contribution is designed in such a way that pensions are always 
increasing functions of individual cumulative contributions (unlike the minimum pension guarantee 
which provides the same pension to all beneficiaries). Another important difference, there is no 
minimum number of contribution periods required to receive the solidarity contribution. The reform 
will be fully effective in about 15 years. In the reformed system and with the same assumptions used 
in Table 1, workers earning a half and a quarter of Chile’s per capita GDP would receive IRRs of 4.5 
and 5.3 ppa, respectively. The reformed system will thus be more redistributive than the current 
one. 17 
The Colombian individual account pillar looks slightly redistributive in our simulations. Low income 
workers receive a moderately high IRR thanks to the minimum pension. 
The Mexican system has a guaranteed minimum pension, about US$ 1,960 a year in 2007, which is 
financed by the government. It also has, as mentioned above, the singularity of a flat contribution 
made by the government for every working person (cuota social). This flat contribution implies a 
greater subsidy, as a proportion of insured contributions, for people with lower earnings, and this 
makes the IRRs decrease with income. The guaranteed minimum pension becomes operative for 
workers earning a quarter of the country’s per capita GDP and that is why the IRR is remarkably 
higher in this case. 
The practical relevance of these different IRRs may be better gauged after noting that one 
percentage point difference in the IRR represents an approximately 27 percent difference in the 
pension, keeping contributions constant.
6
Our assessment of the progressiveness of the social security systems is based on the comparison of 
the IRRs received by covered workers with different average incomes. However, some redistributive 
effects of the systems are not captured by this analysis. In Latin America, governments often 
contribute to the financing of social security with general taxes and significant swaths of the 
population are outside the system (i.e., not covered).  The net effect, the government transfers 
benefit a populace generally comprised of the better-off (i.e., the covered worker). This caveat 
should be kept in mind when comparing the progressiveness of different programs in the region. 
Countries with very low coverage and significant government transfers to social security might end 
up undoing the redistribution that pension programs were supposed to achieve by design. 
  Therefore, with a difference in the IRR like the 4.0 
percentage points obtained in the Argentinean PAYG pillar between a worker earning a quarter of 
and a worker earning four times the country’s per capita GDP, the pension-wage ratio of the poorer 
worker would more than double that of the richest worker in this simulation. 
                                                 
6  The semi-elasticity of pensions to the IRR depends on the enrolment, retirement and death ages. It is 
approximately 27percent when enrolment is at 30, retirement at 65 and death at 73. 18 
3.2.  Impact of the Age-Earnings Profiles 
In order to isolate the impact of average earnings, we held other characteristics equal in the 
set of simulations presented above, but low income workers tend to have flatter age-earnings 
profiles than high income workers and this might impact on the IRRs. Many pension schemes 
provide pensions that depend on the average insured wages during the last years of the working 
careers. As mentioned, these pension formulas benefit workers whose earnings profiles are steeper 
along the lifecycle, as their contributions are based on wages that are on average low relative to the 
wages used to compute their pension. Because of this effect, the programs might be less 
redistributive than what the results in Table 1 suggest. We therefore analyzed the sensitivity of the 
results to workers age-earnings profiles. 
We simulated in each country three different age-earnings profiles, which are associated with three 
different rates of growth of wages and the same average wage along the lifecycle. In several but not 
all cases, the IRR increased with the rate of growth of wages (Table 2). 
Table 2:  Internal Rates of Return and Age-Earnings Profile (IRRs in %) 
  Annual Rate of Growth of Wage 
      One  Two  Three 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  1.0  0.9  0.8 
Argentina (PAYG)  -0.4  0.0  0.4 
Bolivia  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Brazil   -1.8  -1.1  -0.4 
Chile  b/  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (PAYG)  2.1  2.2  2.4 
Ecuador  4.1  4.9  5.7 
Mexico  4.1  4.1  4.1 
Paraguay  2.4  2.4  2.4 
Peru (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Peru (PAYG)  1.5  2.2  2.8 
Uruguay (Opting for mixed DB-DC) a/ b/  1.8  1.6  1.8 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime)      a/  b/  0.0  -0.5  0.1 
Venezuela  6.1  6.7  7.4 
           
Note:  a/ Workers earning less than $5,000 of may 1995 per month (approximately US$8,900 per 
annum, in 2007 US dollars) participate only in the PAYG-DB pillar –the “ordinary regime”–, unless 
they explicitly opt to deposit half of their personal contributions to the savings account pillar.  b/ 
Computed with current norms, which are in the process of being modified by laws passed in 2008. 
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulation equal to per capita GDP, 35 years contributing, 
retirement at 65, age of death is 20 plus life expectancy at 20, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 19 
The Argentinean PAYG pillar displays the typical pattern. The individual whose wage grows faster 
receives a higher rate of return because the pension is computed on the last 10 years of 
contribution rather than on the whole working career. The steeper the worker’s age-earnings 
profile, the higher the wages in the last 10 years relative to his own lifetime average and the higher 
the pension. The same effect is present in all the other PAYG programs in the region. This effect is 
stronger in programs that use shorter periods of contribution to compute the pension. 
The IRRs delivered by purely individual account programs should not depend on the profile of 
lifetime wages, and this is what our simulations show in the cases of the Bolivian, Chilean, 
Colombian, Mexican and Peruvian individual account programs. Some non-pure individual account 
programs, however,  have non-actuarial ingredients that make the return sensitive to the age-
earnings profile. The Argentinean individual account pillar, for example, yields lower IRRs the 
steeper the age-earnings profile (i.e., just the opposite as the Argentinean PAYG pillar). This rather 
unexpected result is due to the impact of the age-earnings profile on the composition of pensions in 
terms of the annuity and the basic pension. Workers with steeper age-earnings profile have a larger 
proportion of their final pension served by the basic pension, which yields a lower rate of return 
than the individual account. To understand this result, it is important to recall that in this set of 
simulations, the average wage was kept constant, which means that flatter profiles imply lower 
wages at the end but higher at the beginning of the working career. In the individual account pillar, 
contributions made at the beginning of the working career count more to the final pension because 
these contributions are being capitalized at a rate of return that surpasses that of the pension 
program. It is thus important to have relatively good wages from the beginning. 
3.3.  The Impact of Life Expectancies 
Workers with a shorter life expectancy receive lower IRRs because pensions are paid for 
fewer periods; and given that pension schemes provide insurance against the “risk” of living too 
long, this is understandable. But this insurance function turns into redistribution when different 
groups of workers with varied life expectancy are covered under the same rules. In particular, low 
income workers are likely to live on average fewer years than high income workers. Once this factor 
is brought to the fore, pension systems look less pro-poor. 20 
Garrett (1995) compares the net U.S. social security returns of households with different average 
income taking into account varying mortality rates. He simulates U.S. workers of the 1925 birth 
cohort and finds that differences in mortality rates may eliminate the progressive spread in returns 
across income levels. Duggan et al. (1995) analyze the impact of differential mortality rates on the 
progressivity of the U.S. Social Security using actual work history records. They find that income-
adjusted mortality rates affect the distribution of benefits across income levels, though not enough 
to undo the basic progressivity of the program. Beach and Davis (1999) report substantial reductions 
in the rates of return from the U.S.  social  security for low income workers when differential 
mortality rates are taken into account. 
Unfortunately, we do not have estimations of life expectancy by income levels in Latin America. To 
assess the possible magnitude of this effect, therefore, we computed the IRRs for the average citizen 
in each country and for workers who live one and two years less than the average citizen (Table 3). 
As expected, the IRRs of workers who live fewer years are smaller. 
Table 3:  Internal Rates of Return and Life Expectancy (IRRs in %) 
  "Age of Death" = 20 + Life Expectancy at 20 
   - 0  - 1  - 2 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  0.9  0.3  -0.6 
Argentina (PAYG)  0.0  -0.7  -1.6 
Bolivia  3.5  2.1  -0.2 
Brazil  -1.1  -2.2  -3.8 
Chile  b/  3.5  3.2  2.7 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.0  2.3 
Colombia (PAYG)  2.2  1.6  0.8 
Ecuador  4.9  4.4  3.8 
Mexico  4.1  3.7  3.3 
Paraguay  2.4  2.0  1.5 
Peru (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.0  2.5 
Peru (PAYG)  2.2  1.6  1.0 
Uruguay (Opting for mixed DB-DC) a/ b/  1.6  0.9  0.1 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime)      a/  b/  -0.5  -1.2  -2.2 
Venezuela  6.7  6.3  5.9 
           
Note:  a/ Workers earning less than US$5,000 of may 1995 per month (approximately US$8,900 
per annum, in 2007 US dollars) participate only in the PAYG-DB pillar –the “ordinary regime”–, 
unless they explicitly opt to deposit half of their personal contributions to the savings account pillar.  
b/ Computed with current norms, which are in the process of being modified by laws passed in 
2008.  
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulations equal to per capita GDP, wages growing at 2% per 
year, 35 years contributing, retirement at 65, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 21 
IV.  Insurance and Incentives to Work 
Pension schemes are bound to distort incentives. Contribution rates are taxes that reduce 
the incentives to work, at least in the formal sector; and pensions reduce the incentives to save. The 
less than actuarial reduction in benefits that is usually associated to shorter working careers 
constitutes a hedge against negative shocks in the labor market; it also generates incentives to 
choose shorter careers. Singularly, it protects senior workers who lose their jobs  and  opens  a 
window to opportunistic behavior. So too, some design characteristics constitute an invitation to 
gamble, like the benefit formulas based on last salaries. These elements are compounded by weak 
enforcement, which facilitates late enrolment and gambling. 
In this section, we use the IRRs to analyze both the incentives pension programs provide to work 
and the insurance they offer against shocks that negatively impact on the length of working careers. 
We separately analyze enrolment and retirement ages, which are two key determinants of the 
length of working careers – as are the number and duration of interruptions in the histories of 
contributions (Bucheli  et al.  2008; Forteza et al. 2009). While we do not explicitly model 
interruptions in this document, the analysis of enrolment ages provides insightful information: Late 
enrolment works as a proxy for short contribution histories due to interruptions in the periods of 
contribution. 
4.1.  Late Enrolment 
The impact of the enrolment age on the IRRs varies widely across the region (Table 4). The 
Argentinean and Uruguayan programs punish individuals who have short histories of contribution as 
a result of late enrolment. The DC individual account programs are mostly neutral, yielding the same 
IRRs irrespective of the enrolment ages, although the Chilean program after the 2008 reform and 
the Mexican program represent interesting exceptions to this rule.  These programs are not totally 
neutral despite being based on the individual account pillar. Finally, the third and largest group of 
programs pays higher IRRs to individuals with short working careers. This group includes the 
Brazilian, Chilean (after the 2008 reform), Ecuadorian, Mexican, Paraguayan, Peruvian PAYG and 
Venezuelan programs. We briefly comment on each group in what follows. 22 
Workers participating in the Argentinean PAYG pillar receive similar IRRs whether they contribute 30 
or 40 years whereas much lower IRRs are received if they contribute less than 30 years. Working 40 
rather than 30 years, individuals receive higher replacement rates (Table 5), which means bigger 
pensions, but the number of contributions is higher too. The trade-off is roughly actuarially fair in 
this range; therefore the IRRs are similar (-0.4 ppa when contributing 40 years and -0.1 ppa for 30 
years’ contribution). In turn, workers who contribute 25 years or less are constrained to receiving a 
pension five years later (i.e., age 70) than the ordinary age. They also receive lower replacement 
rates (Table 5) and smaller pensions than workers who contribute 30 years or more. According to 
the IRRs that we get for the last two cases (Table 4), the reduction in benefits is (much) more than 
actuarially fair, suggesting that the “punishment” for having short contribution histories is too harsh. 
In principle, a defined contribution individual account pillar should be actuarially fair. Fewer 
contributions should be balanced by smaller pensions and the IRRs should be the same irrespective 
of the length of the contribution period. However, the Argentinean individual account pillar departs 
from actuarial fairness, as it seems to punish workers who contribute little. Indeed, as the first row 
in Table 4 shows, the Argentinean individual account pillar yields higher IRRs the longer the 
contribution period. This is because the replacement rates drop very fast as the number of years of 
contribution decrease (Table 5). This unexpected result stems from the non-actuarial component of 
this program, that is, a basic pension that is very sensitive to the number of periods of contribution. 23 
Table 4:  Internal Rates of Return and Length of Contribution Period (IRRs in %) 
  Number of Years Contributing 
   40  35  30  25  20 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  1.1  0.9  0.7  -0.5  -1.0 
Argentina (PAYG)  -0.4  0.0  -0.1  -7.5  -8.2 
Bolivia  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Brazil   -1.5  -1.1  -1.9  -0.9  0.7 
Chile. Post-2008  3.5  3.5  3.7  4.2  5.0 
Chile. Pre-2008  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (PAYG)  1.6  2.2  3.1  2.5  a/ 
Ecuador  4.4  4.9  5.6  6.6  8.3 
Mexico  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4 
Paraguay  1.8  2.4  3.2  4.5  a/ 
Peru (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Peru (PAYG)  2.2  2.2  2.2  3.1  4.9 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Post-2008  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.7  -0.1 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Pre-2008  1.6  1.6  0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Post-2008       -0.5  -0.5  -0.4  -0.1  -3.6 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Pre-2008       -0.5  -0.5  -4.5  -4.5  -4.4 
Venezuela  6.0  6.7  7.8  9.3  11.7 
Note:  a/ Not eligible for pensions. 
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulations equal to per capita GDP, real wages growing at 2% 
per year, retirement at 65, age of death is 20 plus life expectancy at 20, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 
Table 5:  Replacement Rates and Length of Contribution Period (%) 
  Number of Years Contributing 
   40  35  30  25  20 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  113.0  96.9  81.8  53.9  41.5 
Argentina (PAYG)  81.3  80.5  70.5  47.3  40.1 
Bolivia  204.2  171.7  141.5  113.4  87.3 
Brazil  106.8  106.8  86.8  90.0  93.4 
Chile Post-2008  86.0  72.3  62.3  53.9  46.2 
Chile Pre-2008  86.0  72.3  59.6  47.8  36.8 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  130.8  110.0  90.6  100.4  94.4 
Colombia (PAYG)  78.0  78.0  78.0  62.0   
Ecuador  103.0  94.4  85.8  77.2  68.7 
Mexico  65.4  55.0  45.3  36.3  36.3 
Paraguay  107.7  107.7  107.7  107.7   
Peru (Ind. Account)  103.3  86.9  71.6  57.4  44.2 
Peru (PAYG)  77.4  66.3  55.3  51.2  51.2 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Post-2008  123.3  108.5  94.4  81.0  27.7 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Pre-2008  123.3  108.5  200.7  169.5  139.2 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Post-2008       78.0  72.0  66.0  60.0  50.1 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Pre-2008       78.0  72.0  84.8  79.5  72.9 
Venezuela  93.3  87.2  81.1  74.9  68.8 
Notes:  a/ Not eligible for pensions. 
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulations equal to per capita GDP, real wages growing at 2% 
per year, retirement at 65, age of death is 20 plus life expectancy at 20, single male.   
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 24 
The Brazilian pension system does not seem to reward–in an actuarial sense–contributions made 
above the 35 years that are statutorily required to receive the ordinary pension (also referred to as 
the contributory or length of service pension), as workers would receive higher IRRs contributing 35 
rather than 40 years. They would receive the same pension whether contributing 40 or 35 years 
(Table 5).  Even if they would contribute more, they receive the same. In any event, the required 35 
years of contributions is an already-long period in the Brazilian context, so lacking incentives to 
contribute more than this threshold does not seem to be an issue. 
More interesting is to look at the provisions in the Brazilian pension scheme designed to deal with 
shorter contribution histories. The so-called “advanced-age pension” sets the minimum age and 
years of contributions at 65 and 15, respectively. Individuals contributing 30 years or less in our 
simulations are not eligible for the ordinary (length of service) pension, thus  receive the age 
pension. This latter program requires fewer contributions and provides smaller benefits (Table 5) so 
that in our simulations workers contributing 25 and especially 20 years receive higher IRRs than 
workers contributing over longer periods. 
The Uruguayan ordinary program before the 2008 reform strongly punished short working careers. 
As Table 4 shows, the IRRs are much smaller if workers contribute 30 or fewer years than 35 years. 
Workers who fail to contribute 35 years are not eligible for the ordinary pension, and they have to 
wait until they are 70 to receive an advanced-age pension. The IRRs are smaller basically because 
they receive the pension for a shorter period and, to a lesser extent, because the PAYG-DB pension 
is smaller.
7
The 2008 reform smoothed these characteristics, shifting the balance of the scheme from incentives 
to insurance. Workers no longer face significant drops in the IRRs when they contribute less than 35 
years, unless they fall short of 25. Changes in both the ordinary and the advanced-age pension 
programs are behind these results. The minimum number of years of contribution required to 
  Under these rules, workers who worked 30 years or so in the formal sector would have 
strong incentives to continue contributing. These high-powered incentives would probably work fine 
if contributing was just a matter of choice, but contributions depend on chance as well.  Hence, 
these rules could be too extreme. 
                                                 
7 Before the 2008 reform, Uruguayan workers get a higher replacement rate contributing 30 rather than 35 
years (Table 5). This high replacement rate is due to the annuity which increases as the worker with less than 
35 years of contribution starts collecting only at 70. This rise of the annuity does not impact on the IRRs 
though, for the annuity by construction is actuarially fair. In turn, the DB component of the Uruguayan mixed 
pension falls when workers contribute 30 rather than 35 years. 25 
access an ordinary pension was reduced from 35 to 30. In turn, the advanced-age pension is now 
granted at 65 (rather than at 70) with 25 years of contribution. If the worker contributed less than 
25 and more than 15 years, he could still access the advanced-age pension but at older ages: at 66 
with 23 years of contribution, at 67 with 21 years of contribution and so on up to age 70 with 15 
years of contribution. 
The purely DC individual account programs comprise a second group characterized by neutrality in 
the sense that the IRRs are the same irrespective of the enrolment age. By their very structure, 
these programs are actuarially fair so that shorter contribution histories are exactly compensated 
with lower annuities. In this sense, short contribution histories are neither punished nor rewarded. 
This group is represented in the region by the Bolivian, Chilean (pre-2008 reform), Colombian and 
Peruvian individual account programs. 
The third group is composed of programs that provide relatively high IRRs to workers with short 
working careers. As mentioned, two interesting cases in this group are the Chilean (post-2008) and 
Mexican programs, which depart from actuarial fairness despite being based predominately on the 
individual account program. When the 2008 reforms become effective in Chile, the program will 
provide a subsidy to workers who cannot self-finance a pension above a certain threshold, hence 
fewer contributions pay higher IRRs.
8
According to our results, the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan programs strongly discourage long working 
careers, with IRRs decreasing steadily as the careers extend. The same happens in the Colombian 
and Peruvian PAYG programs, although to a lesser extent.  In these programs, the replacement rates 
rise in tandem with the years of contributions; the gains, however, do not actuarially offset the 
added years.  The flat benefit paid to all Venezuelan retirees irrespective of their contributions 
partially accounts for the insufficient rise in pensions relative to individual concerted efforts to 
increase contributions.  Yet, this is not the only explanation. We performed simulations ignoring this 
provision and still obtained important differences in IRRs: 8.5 ppa for workers with 20 years of 
contributions versus 4.8 ppa for workers with 40 years of contribution. 
 In Mexico, the government makes a flat contribution to the 
program.  As the number of worker contribution periods falls and the amount of total contributions 
lowers, the government contribution represents a higher proportion of the individual account. 
                                                 
8 The current Chilean program has redistributive non-actuarial ingredients as well. However, our representative 
worker would not benefit from these ingredients even if he contributed only 20 years. 26 
This occurrence of higher IRRs paid to shorter careers is found in the Paraguayan program as well. 
But unlike other programs in this group, the Paraguayan program  does not have any actuarial 
compensation for more years of contribution:  The pension is exactly the average wage in the last 
three years, no matter the number of years of contribution. Pensions may still grow as workers 
contribute more years if wages in the last years are higher than in previous years, but this is a rather 
indirect and small effect that does not actuarially compensate for the longer period of contributions. 
The only incentive to contribute seems to be that below 25 years, workers receive no benefits. 
In summary, Argentina and Uruguay seem provide stronger incentives to pursue long contribution 
careers; their IRRs are increasing functions of the length of the contribution periods. The counter 
side of these strong incentives is the  weak protection against the risk of having short working 
careers.  The relatively tough pension eligibility conditions in Argentina and Uruguay play a 
significant role in this result, as workers with short contribution histories are not entitled to ordinary 
pensions and must work beyond the ordinary retirement age to receive smaller pensions.
9
                                                 
9 There is some evidence that this toughness in the legal norms has been “accommodated” through weak 
enforcement, so that many workers receive pensions even though they do not fulfil the eligibility conditions 
(Bucheli et al. 2008; Forteza et al. 2009). 
  These 
rules are being softened in Uruguay, as the 2008 reform put in place a phased loosening of the 
eligibility conditions. At the other extreme, Ecuador and Venezuela, according to our computations, 
provide weaker incentives to pursue long contribution careers and better protection against the risk 
of having short careers. Somewhere in towards the middle are the defined contribution individual 
account programs in several Latin American countries (e.g., Chile and Mexico); they are in principle 
actuarially neutral. That being said, some of these programs are not pure schemes, so the IRRs are 
not totally inelastic to the length of the contribution period.  A clear example, the Argentinean 
individual account pillar. 27 
4.2.  Retirement Ages 
Pension programs impact on workers’ decision to stop working. There is a large literature 
that analyzes the relationship between social security provisions and labor force participation, 
mostly in developed countries. The main motivation for these studies is the steady decline in labor 
force participation of senior workers observed in recent decades in most developed countries 
precisely when life expectancies have risen dramatically. Gruber, Wise and collaborators have 
documented these trends and systematically explored the relationship between retirement ages 
and incentives inherent in social security programs in eleven developed countries (Gruber and Wise 
1999, 2004 and 2007). They provide evidence that social security systems have contributed to 
reduce retirement ages in those countries. To the best of our knowledge, there is no comparable 
systematic effort to analyze the impact of social security programs on retirement in developing 
countries. While replicating Gruber and Wise’s analysis for the Latin American region is well beyond 
the scope of the present document, we do provide some systematic comparable analysis of 
incentives to retire inherent in pension programs in the region using our estimations of internal 
rates of return. 
As we have already mentioned, we are not only interested in the analysis of the incentives to retire, 
but also in the social protection that pension programs provide against the risk of short working 
careers. Programs that provide strong incentives to postpone retirement punish workers who retire 
early. From an insurance perspective, however, it seems desirable to protect workers who retire at 
relatively young ages due to adverse circumstances that are beyond choice. Hence, we will use our 
estimations of the IRRs to discuss the insurance that pension programs provide against this risk. 
According to our estimations, some Latin American pension programs strongly discourage 
retirement before pension eligibility while others are relatively neutral. As expected, the defined 
contribution programs are mostly neutral:  They yield basically the same IRR irrespective of the 
retirement age. This is the case of the Bolivian, Chilean, Colombian, Mexican and Peruvian individual 
account programs (Table 6).
10
                                                 
10 The comparatively high IRR and low RR that Colombian workers would receive in the individual accounts 
pillar if they retired at 60 is due to the minimum pension. They receive a lower RR retiring at 60 than at 55 or 
65 because their first pension is a minimum pension.  If they retired either at 55 or at 65, their first pension 
would be an annuity, which is larger than the minimum pension. In turn, they receive a higher IRR retiring at 60 
  In contrast, the defined benefit programs in Argentina, Ecuador and 
Uruguay discourage retirement before pension eligibility ages. 28 
Even in the simple examples presented in Table 6 several forces are at work, so the IRRs do not 
monotonically increase or decrease with the retirement age. Other things equal, a worker who 
retires later contributes more periods. Unless the worker is compensated with a sufficiently larger 
pension, the extension of the contribution period will obviously reduce the IRR. In principle, the 
postponement of retirement will also raise the age at which workers start collecting pensions, which 
also reduces the IRRs (e.g., Colombian PAYG program). This effect can be very large, particularly 
when life expectancy is short, as the example of Brazilian workers retiring at 70 shows. However, in 
some cases the opposite occurs:  If the worker is close to but has not fulfilled the minimum number 
of years required to receive an ordinary pension, he may postpone retirement to complete the 
minimum required periods of contribution. By doing so, the worker accesses an ordinary pension 
rather than an advanced-age pension. In this case, later retirement implies earlier pension claim, 
which positively impacts on the IRRs (see more on this below in the cases of Argentina and Ecuador). 
Finally, the rules included in benefit formulas to reward late retirement with higher pensions usually 
do not actuarially compensate the insured for working additional years and, thereby, abbreviating 
pension spans. 
Despite these general findings, it should be noted that retirement ages impact on the IRRs through 
several channels, some of them rather indirect; precluding any simple relationship between the two. 
Moreover, it is not always the retirement age per se that impacts on the IRRs but the way the 
retirement decision impacts on variables such as the length of the contribution period, the pension 
eligibility age, the age at which the pension is effectively claimed (if it happens after first eligibility 
age) and the average wage on which pensions are computed. Because of this, the impact of the 
retirement age on the IRRs depends on other variables, like the enrolment age and the density of 
contributions. Someone retiring at 60 in Uruguay, for example, is not eligible for an ordinary pension 
if he enrolled in the system at 35, but he is eligible if he enrolled at 25 (and contributed without 
interruption). The results summarized in Table 6 and Table 7 should be read with these remarks in 
mind, avoiding the temptation to draw too general a conclusion from the few cases presented. We 
next turn to further-analyzing several programs to arrive at a better understanding of what is driving 
our results. 
                                                                                                                                                       
because in this case they receive the pension at 62, while if they retired at 55 or 65 they would only receive a 
pension at 65. 29 
In the Argentinean PAYG pillar, the pensionable age for males is 65 (with 30 years of contribution 
and over 65 with fewer). Individuals have the choice to stop working sooner, with the caveat of 
waiting until they turn 65 or older to start collecting.
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The pre-2008 Uruguayan rules severely punish early retirement. Workers who start contributing at 
30, retire at 60 and contribute only to the PAYG pillar receive–3.1 ppa in return. This IRR is 2.6 
percentage points smaller than the return when they retire at 65. Because 35 years of contributions 
are required to access an ordinary pension, a worker retiring at 60 is five years short of the ordinary 
pension but 10 years away from the other entitlement, the advanced-age pension. The IRR is lower 
retiring at 60 than at 65 because the period collecting pensions is shorter (individuals start receiving 
pensions at 70 and die at 73). And this is so despite RRs being higher when workers retire at 60 
compared to 65 (Table 7).  The increase in the annuity derived from late retirement drives this 
result: the annuity is large, but only because workers are expected to collect for a short period. With 
the same work history, the IRRs would be higher if workers opted to direct half of their personal 
contributions to each pillar, although the IRR would still drop if workers retired at 60 rather than 65. 
  The second row of Table 6 is illustrative of 
how severe the fall in the rate of return can be for an Argentinean worker retiring before the 
pensionable age. The fall is due to the drop in the RR and the postponement of the pensionable age 
that is associated to a shorter period of contributions (Table 7). This case is a clear example of how 
the impact of retirement ages on the IRRs crucially depends on the enrolment age. At the other end 
of the spectrum, if a worker delays retirement until 70 and—based on our assumptions—dies at 71, 
only one year of pension is received thus yielding a strongly negative IRR. 
The reform passed in 2008 smoothed out the impact of early retirement because the minimum 
number of years of contribution to access an ordinary pension was reduced to 30 and the eligibility 
age for the advanced-age pension was reduced from 70 to 65. Today, someone who starts 
contributing at 30 and retires at 60 accumulates the 30 years of contribution that are required to 
access an ordinary pension. Even if he receives a smaller pension retiring at 60 than at 65, the IRR is 
higher because of the combined effect of less years contributing and more years collecting the 
pension. There is still a punishment for early retirement, but it is smaller and takes place at a 
                                                 
11 To receive the pension at 65 they must have at least 30 years of contribution. The pensionable age rises if 
the number of periods of contribution reduces. For example, the individual who retires at 55 (first column and 
row in the Table 6) has 25 years of contribution and only get the pension at 70 30 
younger age. Under the conditions assumed to run the simulations presented in Table 6, the fall in 
the IRR takes place if the worker now retires at 55 rather than at 60. 
Chile and Mexico are two of the cases where programs do not seem to provide strong incentives to 
retire at any definite age. In the Chilean system, workers are entitled to an annuity or to 
programmed withdrawals at 65, with no requirement regarding years contributing. Alternatively, 
workers have the option of an early-pension at any age if the accumulated funds adequately finance 
pensions that surpass both an absolute minimum and a certain proportion of their final wages. The 
2008 reform did not change these provisions. The Mexican program grants the ordinary pension at 
65 with 25 years of contribution. It also provides an early-pension with no requirements of age or 
contribution, if the accumulated fund suffices  to finance a pension that surpasses a  certain 
threshold (which is the same for everybody). In the base case scenario, workers have enough funds 
accumulated to retire before 65 in both countries, and because of the actuarial fairness of the 
schemes, the IRRs are the same for all retirement ages. The Argentinean individual account pillar is 
not completely neutral because of the DB ingredients involved in the basic pension. 
Table 6:  Internal Rates of Return and Age at Which Individuals Stop Working (IRRs in %) 
  Age at Retirement 
   55  60  65  70 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  1.0  1.3  0.9  0.4 
Argentina (PAYG)  -3.9  0.3  0.0  -6.9 
Bolivia  3.5  3.5  3.5  a/ 
Brazil  -0.7  -1.4  -1.1  -21.1 
Chile Post-2008  3.9  3.6  3.5  3.5 
Chile Pre-2008  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  3.5  4.5  3.5  3.5 
Colombia (PAYG)  3.0  4.3  2.2  -4.0 
Ecuador  3.3  7.2  4.9  0.3 
Mexico  4.0  4.1  4.1  4.1 
Paraguay  4.3  4.7  2.4  -1.4 
Peru (Ind. Account)  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Peru (PAYG)  4.6  4.1  2.2  -1.6 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Post-2008  2.1  2.5  1.6  -0.2 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Pre-2008  1.0  0.7  1.6  -0.2 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Post-2008       0.7  1.3  -0.5  -6.3 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Pre-2008       -2.1  -3.1  -0.5  -6.3 
Venezuela  7.4  8.0  6.7  3.9 
Note:  a/ Simulated workers die at 69 in Bolivia. 
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulations equal to per capita GDP, real wages growing at 2% 
per year, age of enrolment is 30, age of death is 20 plus life expectancy at 20, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 31 
Table 7:  Replacement Rates and Age at Which Individuals Stop Working (%) 
   Age at Retirement 
   55  60  65  70 
Argentina (Ind. Account)  76  96  97  254 
Argentina (PAYG)  58  78  81  81 
Bolivia  74  78  172   
Brazil   86  87  107  107 
Chile Post-2008  67  72  72  145 
Chile Pre-2008  61  71  72  145 
Colombia (Ind. Account)  119  94  110  321 
Colombia (PAYG)  62  81  78  78 
Ecuador  60  86  94  103 
Mexico  37  33  55  121 
Paraguay  95  108  108  108 
Peru (Ind. Account)  47  55  87  214 
Peru (PAYG)  57  55  66  77 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Post-2008  106  69  108  234 
Uruguay (Optional DB-DC) Pre-2008  228  233  108  234 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Post-2008       73  54  72  90 
Uruguay (Ordinary regime) Pre-2008       97  94  72  90 
Venezuela        58  65  87  112 
              
Note:  a/ Simulated workers die at 69 in Bolivia. 
Assumptions: Average wage in the simulations equal to the average insurable wage of the system, 
real wages growing at 2% per year, age of enrolment is 30, age of death is 20 plus life expectancy 
at 20, single male. 
Sources: Own computations based on Social Security Administration (2008), WHO (2008), World 
Bank Development Indicators, and decrees and laws listed in the references section. 
The Colombian PAYG program does not provide incentives to work beyond 60 years of age in the 
base case scenario.  A higher pension could be received retiring at 65 or even at 70 than at 60, but 
this rise in the monthly pension would not suffice to compensate the additional contributions and 
fewer months receiving the pension. These workers would not be eligible for an ordinary pension if 
they retired at 55 for lack of the required 25 years of contributions. 
The Ecuadorian worker presented in Table 6 has strong incentives to work until 60, as the IRRs are 
considerably smaller if he retires before or after that age. This worker is assumed to enroll at 30. If 
he stops working at 55, he will only be eligible for a pension at 65; if he continues working until 60, 
he will be eligible for a pension at 60. This is because the Ecuadorian program’s eligibility age is 60 if 
the worker contributed 30 years, but 65 if the worker contributed only 15 years. Contributing five 
more years reduces the IRR, but receiving the pension five years earlier increases the IRR. The 
second effect dominates the first in this case and the simulated worker benefits postponing 
retirement until 60. This is a clear example of how the impact of postponing retirement on the IRRs 32 
depends on the whole history of contributions. If the worker had enrolled in the system earlier, for 
example, the retirement age that maximizes his IRR would likely be smaller. 
The Paraguayan program delivers maximum IRRs if the simulated worker retires at 60, a bit less if he 
retires at 55, and much less if he retires later. Retirement at 60 is contingent upon accumulating at 
least 25 years of contributions and at 55 upon 30 years of contributions. In either case, based on our 
assumption of enrolment at 30, he will be eligible for a pension at 60.  The number of years 
accumulated (i.e., 25) would not suffice to access an early pension at 55, while retiring five years 
later (i.e., at 60) does provide the needed number of contributions but increases the pension.  The 
end result is similar IRRs. In turn, no additional benefits are derived for working beyond age 60; 
pensions do not rise despite contributing additional  years and  collecting pensions fewer years. 
Pensions do not rise because the replacement rate is constant at 100 percent. This lack of actuarial 
adjustment naturally leads to declining IRRs as workers compound years; therefore, the Paraguayan 
program provides strong incentives against contributing beyond the minimum required to access 
the ordinary pension. 
Peruvian workers in the PAYG system have incentives to retire at 55. Workers who enrolled at 30 
will have accumulated only 25 years of contributions if they retire at 55. They will not be eligible for 
early retirement (55 years of age and 30 of contribution are the qualifying conditions for this 
benefit) and will have to wait until they turn 60 to receive the pension. The eligibility age in this case 
is the same whether workers choose to retire at 55 or at 60. Retiring at 60 rather than 55,more 
contributions  are paid yet  higher pensions are not yielded  because these workers receive the 
minimum pension.
12
The Venezuelan workers have incentives to retire at 60. The IRRs are smaller if they retire either at 
55 or at 65. In the Venezuelan program, the ordinary pension requires 60 years of age and 15 years 
of service, but people who retire younger can receive an old-age grant if they have contributed for 
  In turn, if workers choose to retire at 65 rather than at 60, they pay more years 
of contributions and receive higher pensions over fewer years. Our simulations show that the rise in 
pensions does not offset the additional contributions and the reduced pensionable years, hence the 
IRR is significantly lower if workers retire at 65 rather than at 60. Similar effects occur if workers 
postpone retirement even further beyond 65. 
                                                 
12 It may look surprising that the replacement rate is actually a bit smaller retiring at 60 than at 55. This is only 
because the wage in the denominator is larger at 60 than at 55, while the pension is in this case the same. 33 
at least two whole years in the last four. Workers who enroll at 30 and retire at 55 obtain this grant 
until they comply with the ordinary pension requirements, which in this case occur when they turn 
60. From then on, these workers receive the ordinary pension. Workers retiring at 60 receive larger 
pensions, contribute more years and receive pensions fewer years than workers retiring at 55. The 
first effect dominates the last two and hence the IRR is higher when workers retire at 60 rather than 
at 55. In turn, postponing retirement even further is not profitable. Even though pensions rise when 
workers retire at 65 rather than at 60, the combination of more periods contributing and fewer 
periods receiving pensions make this option unappealing. 
In general, the programs do not provide incentives to retire at 70 or later. In the defined 
contribution programs the IRRs do not vary with the retirement age, and in the PAYG and mixed 
schemes the IRRs are much smaller when workers retire at 70 than at 65. 34 
V.  Conclusion 
We present in this paper estimations of the internal rates of return (IRR) and replacement 
rates (RR) that formal workers in eleven Latin American countries receive from social security. We 
first use these indicators to assess the programs in terms of the return workers receive in a base 
case scenario. We then move to the analysis of diversity: we want to know how the programs treat 
both individuals of different standings and individuals of similar standings in different circumstances.  
Analyzing the return of the former, we assess whether social security programs in Latin America 
reduce income inequality.  Analyzing the return of the latter, we assess insurance and incentives. 
Our analysis of inequality is based on simulations run for hypothetical workers who differ in terms of 
(i) wage level, (ii) age-earnings profiles and (iii) life expectancy. All the defined benefit programs 
analyzed in this study are in principle progressive in the sense that they provide higher returns to 
low than to high income workers. This result should be qualified,  however. Several of these 
programs yield higher IRRs to workers with steeper age-earnings profiles, usually representative of 
the better-off, and all of these programs yield lower IRRs to workers with lower life expectancies, 
generally attributed to low income workers. 
In Argentina and Uruguay, pension programs punish short contribution careers with very low IRRs. 
This is probably an intended result, with  the idea being  to provide incentives for making 
contributions. Short working careers, however, can be the result of the unforeseen circumstances, 
like the onset of debilitating diseases or simple bad luck, and these pension programs compound the 
income loss suffered. While it is perfectly natural for an insurance program to look at its provision of 
incentives, our results suggest excessive incentives at the sacrifice of insurance. Recent analysis 
about the histories of contribution to social security show that most Argentinean and Uruguayan 
contributors to social security are not in the way of accumulating the number of years of 
contribution required to access pensions at the ordinary retirement ages (Bucheli et al. 2008; 
Forteza et al. 2009). According to our results, these workers would receive very low IRRs from the 
system if the rules were strictly enforced. These findings suggest that the incentives these low IRRs 
represent have not been effective in inducing longer histories of contribution in these countries. 
One possible reason is weak enforcement:  Workers expect to receive pensions even if they do not 
fulfill formal conditions. 35 
In the absence of moral hazard (e.g., if short contribution histories were just the result of bad luck) 
the optimal insurance would be to provide full protection against the risk of short working careers. 
Full insurance in this case means that pensions should be independent of the number of periods of 
contribution. But as individuals can materially modify the probability of getting a job in the formal 
sector making choices unobserved by the social security administrations, a full insurance program 
would severely distort incentives. Individuals would in this case avoid contributions. The standard 
solution to moral hazard in the insurance industry is to provide partial insurance. In pension 
programs, this means that pensions cannot be held constant irrespective of the number of periods 
of contribution. The optimal degree of risk the individual should be facing depends on parameters 
that are not directly observable, so we cannot easily determine such a rule.  An actuarially fair 
reduction of the pension in response to shorter contribution histories would already be harsh (i.e., 
no insurance against the risk of short contribution careers), but the observed designs that reduce 
pensions by more than that look unnecessarily harsh. Rather than providing insurance, these 
programs create risk. 
In Chile (when the 2008 reform is fully operational) and Mexico, pension programs provide some 
insurance against the risk of short contribution careers.  Individuals with few years of contributions 
receive  larger IRRs than individuals with long contribution histories. The RRs are nevertheless 
increasing functions of the length of the contribution period (i.e., workers with short contribution 
histories receive low RRs in both countries). Therefore, these programs provide some protection 
against the risk of short working careers and also address incentives by providing partial insurance 
against this risk. 
The Ecuadorian and Venezuelan pension programs also deliver larger IRRs to workers with short 
contribution careers, but they seem to go much further than the Chilean and Mexican programs. In 
the base case scenario, while in Chile and Mexico workers would lose 1.5 and 0.4 percentage points 
per annum respectively if they contributed 40 rather than 20 years, in Ecuador and Venezuela 
workers would lose as much as 3.9 and 5.7 percentage points per annum respectively under the 
same scenario.  As in other countries, the RRs in Ecuador and Venezuela are increasing functions of 
the length of the contributions period and, thus, do not provide full insurance against the risk of 
short working careers. Yet, the striking losses in the rates of return that Ecuadorian and Venezuelan 
workers suffer if they continue contributing beyond 20 years suggest that the incentives to 
contribute are too weak in these cases. 36 
While we cannot say what the optimal insurance contract in each country should look like, our 
results suggest that the Brazilian, post-2008 Chilean and Mexican programs engineered a better 
balance between insurance and incentives than the other programs. While the Argentinean (PAYG) 
and the Uruguayan programs seem to have shifted the balance too far  towards incentives, 
submitting workers to excessive risk, the incentives provided by the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan 
programs are probably too weak. 
Our results regarding the return workers with short contribution careers receive from social security 
also have a bearing on the income inequality issue. Low wage workers have more frequent and 
durable interruptions in their contribution histories than high wage workers (Bucheli et al. 2008; 
Forteza et al. 2009). The very low IRRs that the Argentinean and Uruguayan pension programs yield 
to workers with short contribution histories impact thus primarily on low income workers. Ironically, 
two of the programs that provide better protection against this risk that is highly prevalent among 
the poor are built on individual savings accounts–the Chilean and the Mexican programs– and the 
two programs that impose very negative results on workers who do not manage to contribute long 
enough are to a large extent based on “intergenerational solidarity”. 
Argentina, Chile and  Uruguay passed reforms to their main pension programs  in 2008. The 
Argentinean reform basically eliminates the individual account pillar, so the results we present for 
the existing PAYG pillar would still hold. In turn, the Chilean and Uruguayan reforms are parametric, 
in the sense that they change parameters but do not modify the basic architecture of the programs. 
According to our simulations, the Chilean and Uruguayan reforms reinforced social protection as the 
balance shifted towards insurance and away from incentives. 
This document is an intermediate product of a research line that is still in progress. We presented a 
relatively detailed discussion of several scenarios mostly to show the various effects at work even in 
relatively simple simulations. Our results suggest patterns, but the complexity of the involved effects 
necessitates that these results be taken with caution. In any event, we hope that the database that 
accompanies this document will serve other observers of Latin American pension systems to 
perform their own analysis. 
Future steps involve the inclusion of more countries, the development of a more formal and explicit 
analytical framework and the presentation of a wider range of simulations. While the first point 
requires no justification,  the other two merit a few remarks. Regarding the analytics, we have 37 
borrowed some basic concepts from agency theory to illuminate our discussion of the empirical 
results in this paper. We have, on the other hand, made no attempt to present a formal elaboration 
of these concepts. At this stage of our research, we feel that we would greatly benefit from a more 
systematic integration of the rich and powerful concepts of agency theory in our analysis. 
Regarding the set of simulations, we would like to explore several extensions of our current work. 
An obvious one is to include both genders, as the results in the present document refer exclusively 
to men. Inclusion of survivor benefits and focusing on families rather than on single individuals are 
also important  extensions. Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) show that, when analyzed at the 
individual level, the U.S. social security looks very redistributive, favoring low income workers, but it 
looks much less so at the family level. Another important extension is the inclusion of disability 
benefits. 
 Finally,  the complexity of the systems suggests that running more simulations is advisable to 
confirm the robustness of some results. Consider for example the analysis of the impact of 
retirement ages on the IRRs. Since the IRRs depend on the whole histories of contribution, 
postponing retirement one year may have quite different impacts on the IRRs depending on the 
enrolment age, the densities of contribution, the average wage and the age-earnings profile. So too, 
as the impact of the retirement age on the IRRs is a non-monotone relationship, choosing only two 
or three points in each dimension may not be adequate to fully characterize these functions. A 
problem of dimensionality immediately arises. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the nature of 
these programs, educated with a more systematic use of formal analytical tools, seems necessary to 
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Annex: Description of Systems 




Source of funds:  
Insured person: 11% of covered earnings 
Employer: 11.44% of gross payroll 
 
Contribution wage floor = US$ 78 (3 MOPRES) 
Contribution wage ceiling = US$ 1,954 (75 
MOPRES). 
 
Qualifying Conditions:  
a) “Ordinary”: Age 65 with 30 years of contributions 
and service.  
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 10 years of service 
c) “Early Retirement”: the annuity surpasses 50% of 




a) “Ordinary” =  annuity 
b) “Advanced Age” = 70% of the ordinary annuity  
c) “Early Retirement” = annuity 
Additional 
 
Source of funds:  
Insured person: 11% of covered earnings 
Employer: 11.44% of gross payroll 
 
Contribution wage floor = US$ 78 (3 MOPRES) 
Contribution wage ceiling = US$ 1.954 (75 
MOPRES). 
 
Qualifying Conditions:  
a) “Ordinary”: Age 65 with 30 years of service. The 
insured may substitute 2 years of age after the 
retirement age for 1 year of contributions. 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 10 years of service  
c) “Early Retirement”: (Age 60 and 30 years of 
service. This program is being phased out since 
April of 2007) 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary”= (1.5/100) * average wages * t, where 
t= min(length of service, 35).
13
Minimum pension (Additional + UBP) = US$ 173.  
 
Maximum pension (Additional + UBP) = US$ 1,267. 
b) “Advanced Age” = 70% of the “Ordinary 
additional”  
c) “Early Retirement”: being phased out since April 
of 2007 
Universal Basic Pension 
 
Source of funds: 10.17 or 12.71% for private workers and 16% for civil servants (employers contributions) 
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “Ordinary”: Age 65 with 30 years of service 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 10 years of service 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = 2,5*MOPRE + 0.01*2.5*MOPRE*(t-30);  45 30 ≤ ≤t ,  
MOPRE = US$ 26  
b) “Advanced Age” = 70% of the Ordinary UBP 
where: 
- covered earnings = 3*MOPRE < wage < 75 * MOPRE. 
- average wages= average wages of the last 10 years. 
 
Options: By default, the worker is covered by UBP + Individual Account. He may choose for the Additional at the 
beginning, and being there he can change pillars but with no return. 
The average wage index is used to update the MOPRE and for the “valorisation” of wages for the computation of 
pension (Decree 1.306/00 and Law 24.241, art 24). 
                                                 




Source of Funds: 




Floor = minimum wage 
Ceiling=60 * minimum wage 
With minimum wage= US$ 65.5      
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “Ordinary” = At age 65 or at any age if the accumulated capital in the individual account, plus accrued 
interest, is sufficient to finance a monthly pension equal to 70% of the insured’s average covered 
earnings in the last 5 years. 
 
Benefits= individual account annuity.  
 
Min: 70% of the insured’s average covered earnings in the last 5 years.  





Source of fund (all amounts are expressed on a monthly basis): 
 
Insured Person  
8% of  wage if wage < US$ 452 
9% of wage if US$ 452 < wage < US$ 754 
11% of wage if wage > US$ 754 
floor = minimum wage = US$198 
ceiling = US$ 1,507 
 
Employer: 20% of payroll 
 
Qualifying Conditions 
a) “Ordinary”:  35 years of service 




a) “Ordinary”= average wages * fator previdenciario 
b) “Advanced Age” =0.7 * average wages * (1+0.01*(length of service)) 
 
Max average wage =  US$ 1,390 
Max pension: average of the last 36 monthly contribution wages. 
where: 
- average wages = average of the 80% highest (updated) wages. 
-fator previdenciario = (0.31 * (length of service) / life expectancy) *  
((1 + (0.31 * (length of service) + retirement age) / 100). 
-penalization = min (1 , (1 - 0.05 * max ( 0 , (35 - length of service)))). 
 
All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. Also wages used to compute pensions are valorized according to 
CPI. 42 
Chile 
Pre-2008 Reform System 
Individual Account 
 
Source of funds: 12.55% of covered wages (Insured Person).  
Floor = US$ 274.23 (if 18 ≤  age< 65) or US$ 204.74 (if 65 ≤ age) 
Ceiling = 60*UF; where UF = US$ 35.46 
 
Qualifying Conditions:  
a) “Ordinary”: Age 65  
b) “Early Retirement”: if individual account annuity surpasses the 70% of the average wage of the last 10 
years and also surpasses the 150% of the minimum pension. 
c)Guaranteed minimum pension: Age 65 with 20 years of service if annuity is less than a minimum pension 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary”=individual account annuity.  
b) “Early Retirement” = individual account annuity. 
c)“Guaranteed minimum pension”= US$170.85 if age<70 or US$186.82 if age≥70 
 PAYG 
We haven’t analyzed this pillar because it is being phased out since 1981. 
 
All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. 
Post-2008 Reform System 
Individual Account 
Source of funds: 12.55% of covered wages (Insured Person).  
Floor = US$ 274 (if 18 ≤ age < 65) o US$ 204 (if 65 ≤ age) 
Ceiling = 60*UF; UF = US$ 35 
Qualifying Conditions:  
a) “Ordinary”: Age 65  
b) “Early Retirement”: if annuity surpasses 70% of the average wage of the last 10 years and also surpasses 
the 150% of the minimum pension. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary”=individual account annuity.  
b) “Early Retirement” = individual account annuity. 
 
Solidarity 
Source of funds:  
a) “BSP-Advanced Age” (Basic Solidarity Pension): financed by the government 
b) “Elderly-PSC” (Previsional Solidarity Contribution): financed by the government 
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “BSP-Advanced Age”: Age 65, no right to receive other pensions, and being a member of a low income 
household.  
b) “Elderly-PSC”: Age 65, with a self financed pension (the so-called base pension = BP) higher than cero 
and lower than or equal to a Maximum Pension (MP), and being a member of a low income household. 
Maximum pension: US$133  from 07/2008 to 06/2009 
with solidarity         US$229  from 07/2009 to 06/2010 
contribution (MP)   US$286  from 07/2010 to 06/2011   
                                US$381  from 07/2011 to 06/2012 
                                US$486  from 07/2012 
Benefits: 
a) “BSP-Advanced Age”: US$114 between 07/2008 and 06/2009; and US$143 from 06/2009.  
b) “Elderly-PSC” =  BSP - (BSP/MP)*BP                                          if MP≥BP≥BSP 




Source of funds: 
Insured person = 0,04 * ins_wage1 + 0,01 * 
ins_wage2 (if wage > 4* min_wage) + 0.002 * 
ins_wage3 + 0.004 * ins_wage4 + 0.006 * 
ins_wage5 + 0.008 * ins_wage6 + 0,01 * ins_wage7 
Employer =12% 
 






a) “Ordinary” =individual account annuity must 
surpass the 110% of a min_wage. 
b) “Guaranteed minimum pension” = Age 62 with 23 
years of service 
 
Benefits: 




b) “Guaranteed minimum pension” = If the pension 
is less than the minimum pension set by law, the 
government makes up the difference. 
Min: US$ 228 
PAYG  a/ 
 
Source of funds: 
Insured person = 0,04 * ins_wage1 + 0,01 * 
ins_wage2 (if wage > 4* min_wage) + 0.002 * 
ins_wage3 + 0.004 * ins_wage4 + 0.006 * ins_wage5 
+ 0.008 * ins_wage6 + 0,01 * ins_wage7 
Employer =12% 
The government also contributes to this pillar 
pensions (partial subsidy). 
 




a) “Ordinary” = Age 62 with 26 years of service.  
b) “Guaranteed minimum pension” = Age 62 with 
26.5 years of service 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = R * BMW + 0.015 * BMW * (years of 
service beyond the minimum) 
where: 
 R= 0.655-0.05*(wage/minimum wage) 
 
b) “Guaranteed minimum pension” = If the pension is 
less than the minimum pension set by law, the 
government makes up the difference. 
Min: US$ 228 
Max: 0.8 * BMW 
a/ Parameters programmed to be operational from 2015 onwards, when our simulated workers will retire. 
ins_wage1= wage      if wage <  4*min_wage 
ins_wage2= wage-(4*min_wage)  if 4*min_wage ≤ wage < 16*min_wage 
ins_wage3= wage-(16*min_wage)  if 16*min_wage ≤ wage < 17*min_wage 
ins_wage4= wage-(17*min_wage)  if 17*min_wage ≤ wage < 18*min_wage 
ins_wage5= wage-(18*min_wage)  if 18*min_wage ≤ wage < 19*min_wage 
ins_wage6= wage-(19*min_wage)  if 19*min_wage ≤ wage < 20*min_wage 
ins_wage7= wage-(20*min_wage)  if  wage ≥ 20*min_wage 
All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. 
BMW = The basic monthly wage is based on the insured’s average earnings in the last 10 years before 






Source of funds: 
Insured person: 6.64%  
Employer: 3.10%  
Government: Finances 40% of the cost of social insurance pensions; the total cost of social assistance pensions; 
contributes as an employer. 
 
Floor=min_wage=US$240  
There is no ceiling.  
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
“Ordinary” = Paid at any age with at least 40 years of contributions; age 60 with at least 30 years of contributions; 
age 65 with at least 15 years of contributions; or age 70 with at least 10 years of contributions. 
 





< ≤ − +
40 _ * ) 0125 . 0 * ) 40 ( 1 (
40 10 _ * )) 60 / 1 ( * ) 10 ( 5 . 0 (
x if wage avg x
x if wage avg x
 
 
wherex = contributing years; and avg_wage= average monthly earnings in the best 5 years 
 
Max: US$ 9720 




Source of fund: 
Insured person: 1.75% of covered earnings.  
Employer: 5.15% of covered earnings.  
Government: social contribution (cuota social), equal to 5.5% of the minimum wage, plus 0.35% of the worker’s 
wage 
 
Contribution wage floor = minimum wage; where minimum wage = US$117.5 (we accounted 25 labor days per 
month) 
Contribution wage ceiling = 25* minimum wage = US$ 2,937.5 
 
Qualifying Conditions:  
a) “Ordinary”= Age 65 with 25 years of service 
b) “Early Retirement”= if the annuity surpasses by at least 30% the guaranteed minimum pension. 




a) “Ordinary”=individual account annuity.  
b) “Early Retirement” = individual account annuity. 
c)“Guaranteed minimum pension”= US$163 
PAYG 
We haven’t analyzed this pillar because it is being phased out since 1997. 
All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. 





Source of funds: 





There is no ceiling.  
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “Ordinary” = Age 60 and 25 years of service. 
 
b) “Early pension”= Age 55 and 30 years of service. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = avg_wage 
where avg_wage=average earnings in the last 3 years 
 
b) “Early pension”= 0.8* avg_wage + 0.04* avg_wage*(min(59 , age-55)) 
 
Max: US$ 2425 
 
Min: US$ 60 





Source of funds:  12.72% of covered earnings 
(Insured Person).                         
floor = US$ 157.7, and there is no ceiling 
 
Qualifying Conditions = Age 65; a pension is paid at 
any age if the individual account has accumulated 
assets that will replace at least 50% of average 
indexed earnings in the last 120 months. 
 






Source of funds: 13% of covered earnings (Insured 
Person).                       
floor = US$ 157.7, and there is no ceiling 
 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “Ordinary” = Age 60 with 20 years of service.  
b) “Early pension” = Age 55 and 30 years of service. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = 0.3*avg_pen_wage + 
0.02*avg_pen_wage*(contributing years exceeding 
20, max 100%) 
where avg_pen_wage= average earnings in the last 
60 months 
b) “Early pension” = The pension is reduced by 4% 
for each year that the pension is taken before the 
normal pensionable age. 
Minimum: $ 130 
Maximum: $ 270 
Constant-attendance supplement: A monthly amount 
is paid equal to the minimum wage (US$ 157.7). 
 
All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. 
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Uruguay 
Law 16713 (Passed in 1995)  
Individual Account 








449 , 1 $ ; 724 $ 449 , 1 $  
449 , 1 $ wage 724    US$ if ; 724   US$ - wage
    AC    where AC; * 0.15




a) “Ordinary”: Age 60 with 35 years of service 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 15 years of service, and the individual doesn’t have any pension. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = individual account annuity.  











724 $  wage if 724; $
724 $  wage if   wage;





a) “Ordinary”: Age 60 with 35 years of service 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 15 years of service 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = average wages * rr,  
Where: rr = 0.5 + 0.005*(contributing years exceeding 35, max 2,5%) + 0.02*(years of postponing 
retirement after 60 if pension right wasn’t configured yet, max 20%) + 0.03*(years of postponing 
retirement after 60, max 30%); and 
average wages = average of the best 20*12 wages or average of the last 10*12 wages, whichever is 
greater. 
b) “Advanced Age” = average wages * rr; where rr = 0,5 +0.01* (contributing years exceeding 15, max 
14%) 
 
Minimum: US$    80 
Maximum: US$ 598 
Workers whose first wages lie below the US$ 724 threshold may opt to split their insured contributions by halves 
between the individual account and the PAYG pillars. Opting workers receive a special bonus of 50% of their 
PAYG pension. 
The nominal amounts are updated using the average wage index.  47 
Uruguay(Cont.) 
Law 16713 Plus Amendments Passed between 1995 and 2008 
Individual Account 
 







449 , 1 $ ; 724 $ 449 , 1 $  
449 , 1 $ wage 724    US$ if ; 724   US$ - wage
    AC    where AC; * 0.15




a) “Ordinary”: Age 60 with 30 years of service 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 65, and the individual does not have any pension. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = individual account annuity.  
b) “Advanced Age”  = individual account annuity 
PAYG 
 







724 $  wage if 724; $
724 $  wage if   wage;






a) “Ordinary”: Age 60 with 30 years of service 
b) “Advanced Age”: Age 70 with 15 years of service, or 69 and 17, or 68 and 19, or 67 and 21, or 66 and 
23, or 65 and 25, and the individual does not have any pension. 
 
Benefits: 
a) “Ordinary” = average wages*rr;  
Where: rr = 0,45 + 0,01*(contributing years exceeding 30, max 5%) + 0,005*(contributing years 
exceeding 35 when pension right is configured, max 2,5%) + 0,02 * (years of postponing retirement after 
60 if contributing years are lower than 35, max 20%) + 0.03 * (years of postponing retirement after 60 if 
contributing years are higher than 35, max 30%); and 
average wages = average of the best 20*12 wages or average of the last 10*12 wages, whichever is 
greater. 
b) “Advanced Age” = average wages*rr;  
Where: rr= 0,5 +0.01*(contributing years exceeding X, max 14%), and X=years of service required 
according to age. 
 
Minimum: US$    80 
Maximum: US$ 598 
Workers whose first wages lie below the US$ 724 threshold may opt to split their insured 
contributions by halves between the individual account and the PAYG pillars. Opting workers receive 
a special bonus of 50% of their PAYG pension. 
The nominal amounts are updated using the average wage index. 48 
Venezuela 
PAYG 
Source of Funds: 
Insured person: 1.93% of gross earnings 
Employer: 4.82% of payroll  
Government: 1.5%  
Ceiling= five times the minimum urban wage 
There is no floor. 
Qualifying Conditions: 
a) “Ordinary” = Age 60 with 15 years of service 
b) “Old-Age Grant”= 2 whole years of contribution in the last 4 years  
Benefits:  
a) “Ordinary” = US$ 138 + 0.3*avg_pen_wage + 0.01* avg_pen_wage* (years of contribution exceeding 
15).  
Where: avg_pen_wage= average earnings in the last five years or the average in the best five of the last 
10 years, whichever is greater. 
An additional 5% of the pension is paid for each year the pension is deferred after the pensionable age. 
b) “Old-age grant” = 10% of the insured’s total covered earning.  
Min: 40% of  avg_pen_wage 
 
Note:  All nominal variables are adjusted by the CPI. 
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www.worldbank.org/sp. Summary Findings
We present a new database of social security indicators for eleven 
Latin American countries designed to assess pension schemes in terms 
of the payments they promise in return to contributions. Based on 
this data, we analyze inequality, insurance and incentives to work, 
using the replacement rates and the internal rates of return implicit 
in the flows of contributions and pensions. Our results indicate that 
most programs analyzed are progressive in the sense that, other things 
equal, they yield higher returns to low than to high income workers. 
Poor workers, notwithstanding, often have flat age-earnings profiles 
and lower life expectancy, both of which reduce the rates of return 
received  from  social  security. The  Argentinean  and  (the  pre-2008) 
Uruguayan  programs  severely  punish  short  contribution  careers, 
providing strong incentives for workers in the programs to continue 
contributing until they reach minimums that vary between 30 and 35 
years of contributions. The counterpart is that these programs do not 
hedge workers against the risk of having short working careers; quite the 
opposite, they raise the uncertainty workers face. The very low rates of 
return that the Argentinean and Uruguayan main pension programs pay 
to workers with short working careers are likely to impact strongly on 
low income workers, as the probability they experience interruptions 
is higher. The Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican programs show a better 
balance between insurance against the risk of short working careers 
and incentives to work. The defined benefit programs of Argentina, 
Ecuador and Uruguay strongly discourage early retirement; the Chilean 
and Mexican programs are more neutral. Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
passed  reforms  to  their  main  pension  programs  in  2008.  Unlike 
the Argentinean  reform,  the  Chilean  and  Uruguayan  2008  reforms 
strengthened  the  social  protection  that  programs  provide,  shifting 
the  balance  towards  more  insurance  and  less  incentives  to  work.
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